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DODD-FRANK AND THE SPOOFING
PROHIBITION IN COMMODITIES MARKETS
Meric Sar*
The Dodd-Frank Act amended the Commodity Exchange Act and
adopted an explicit prohibition regarding activity commonly known
as spoofing in commodities markets. This Note argues that the
spoofing prohibition is a necessary step towards improved market
discipline and price integrity in the relevant commodities markets. It
fills an important gap in the CEA in relation to an elusive form of price
manipulation activity by providing an explicit statutory authority on
which regulators and market operators may rely in policing suspect
trading strategies falling under the spoofing umbrella. Congress’
explicit denouncement of spoofing as an illegal act has ramifications
not only for traders, but also for brokers and market makers. In the
past, when courts have considered the issue of secondary liability of
brokers regarding manipulative activity of their customers in the
context of wash sales, they have determined the CEA’s explicit
prohibition of wash sales and the relatively easier identification of
wash sales activity as important factors that may potentially increase
the secondary liability risk of derivatives brokers. Applying the same
analogy to spoofing, greater public awareness and the increasing
visibility of spoofing activity (resulting from improvements in the
monitoring systems of regulators and market operators) will provide
strong incentives for market participants to adapt to changing norms.
However, areas of concern, such as risk of selective enforcement and
inconsistencies among the applicable market rules, will pose
challenges in the spoofing prohibition’s implementation. Therefore,
regulators must seek cooperation with relevant market operators to
encourage structural reform and self-regulatory measures, such as
implementation of appropriate structural safeguards into the trading
infrastructure.

* Istanbul University, LL.B. (2010); Georgetown, LL.M. (2013); Fordham University
School of Law, J.D. (2017); member of New York and Istanbul bar associations. The
author has worked as a legal intern at U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Division of Enforcement and Whistleblower Office (2016). The opinions expressed
herein belong solely to the author.
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INTRODUCTION
For a long time the illegality of spoofing has been a point of
contention among lawyers and economists. Spoofing is a form of price
manipulation activity.1 A spoofer submits to a market non-bona fide price
quotes in order to cause artificial price volatility.2 It creates market noise,
and makes an order book unreliable and deceptive for analysts and

1. See Eun Jung Leea, Kyong Shik Eomb & Kyung Suh Park, MicrostructureBased Manipulation: Strategic Behavior and Performance of Spoofing Traders, 16 J. FIN.
MKTS. 227 (2013).
2. Id.
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traders.3 Usually, it is employed as part of a predatory trading strategy in
which the trader actually holds an opposite market position—or has the
intent to immediately take such a position—to take unfair advantage of
the market’s confusion caused by the deceptive market signals created by
the trader. Among myriad other important changes, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) introduced
a statutory prohibition on spoofing for the first time, with a limited
application to commodities markets in its current form.4
The spoofing provision is remarkable for two reasons. First, its
enactment coincides with a growing discontent in the financial industry
regarding predatory trading conduct in general.5 Second, though widely
accepted as detrimental to the price discovery function of the markets,6
spoofing activity was in the past too elusive to prosecute under the general
anti-manipulation authority of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”).7
Thus, the prohibition has the potential to drastically alter the way markets
operate by creating a stand-alone statutory prohibition that can be
enforced by both agency actions and private lawsuits.8

3. See generally Steven R. McNamara, The Law and Ethics of High-Frequency
Trading, 17 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 71 (2016); Alvaro Cartea et al., Ultra-Fast
Activity and Market Quality (Apr. 7, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2616627 [https://perma.cc/F24W-EBDU].
4. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5) (2012); see also CFTC, Staff Roundtable on Disruptive
Trading Practices (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.cftc.gov/idcucm/groups/public/@swaps/do
cuments/dfsubmission/dfsubmission24_120210-transcri.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G9C-9H
UU].
5. See generally Matthew Leising & Janan Hanna, Can a $24 Billion Hedge Fund
Blow the Whistle? Citadel Thinks So, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.bloomb
erg.com/news/articles/2016-04-29/can-a-24-billion-hedge-fund-blow-the-whistle-citade
l-thinks-so [https://perma.cc/6C2X-MHMB].
6. See In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 184 (2d Cir.
2013) (“This makes sense: excessive speculation, just as much as manipulation, can result
in market illiquidity and artificial prices.”).
7. For the difficulty of proving spoofing cases under the pre-Dodd-Frank antimanipulation standard, see Bart Chilton, Comm’r, CFTC, Statement Regarding AntiFraud and Anti-Manipulation Final Rules: The Waiting (July 7, 2011), http://www.cftc.
gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/chiltonstatement070711 [https://perma.cc/5EFX-L
3VT].
8. See 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2012). CEA’s explicit grant of authority for private right of
action is a distinct feature of commodities law in comparison to the judicially developed
availability of private right of action in securities law, the doctrine of which was, to a big
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CEA broadly defines spoofing as “bidding or offering with the intent
to cancel the bid or offer before execution” in relation to any trading that
occurs on, or subject to, the rules of an exchange regulated by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).9 Although the
prohibition applies to both manual and automated trading, in today’s
markets where the majority of day trading is conducted via algorithmic
trading strategies, the ramifications of the prohibition can be manifold for
institutional proprietary traders, brokers, and market makers.10
The increasing availability of hyper-frequency trading infrastructure
to access the interrelated markets for thousands of different securities and
derivatives contracts renders the policing of predatory trading practices a
priority for market regulators and participants.11 In the age of advanced
trading technology that is widely available, events such as the flash crash
of 2010, during which the stock market fluctuated more than 9% within
thirty-six minutes while “bids on dozens of ETFs (and other stocks) fell
as low as a penny a share,”12 demonstrate the inherent fragility of daily

extent, developed by the courts. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975).
9. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (2012).
10. See RICHARD HAYNES & JOHN S. ROBERTS, CFTC, AUTOMATED TRADING IN
FUTURES MARKETS (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@economic
analysis/documents/file/oce_automatedtrading.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NFC3-YVE9]
(“Recent studies on automated trading in domestic markets have found that often over
half of the trades on securities and futures exchanges make some use of algorithms . . . to
match trades, oversee certain order types (e.g., stop orders) and monitor general market
risk.”); see also CFTC v. Oystacher, No. 15-CV-9196, 2016 WL 3693429, at *15 (N.D.
Ill. July 12, 2016) (“Algorithmic traders include a variety of participants, ranging from
brokerage firms who seek favorable trade executions on behalf of clients entering longterm investment positions or hedges to proprietary firms who trade on a principal basis
in pursuit of short-term profit opportunities.”).
11. Spoofing-type activity is argued to be one of the contributing factors to the flash
crash of May 6, 2010. See Andrei Kirilenko et al., The Flash Crash: High Frequency
Trading in an Electronic Market, 72 J. FIN. (forthcoming 2017). The systemic risk caused
by algorithmic trading strategies has been studied since the 1980s. See Lewis D. Solomon
Howard, The Crash of 1987: A Legal and Public Policy Analysis, 57 FORDHAM L. REV.
191 (1988).
12. Ari I. Weinberg, Should You Fear the ETF?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/should-you-fear-the-etf-1449457201 [https://perma.cc/CU
5L-AXA6].
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markets against disruptive market practices.13 Under the prohibition, a
wide range of trading activity traditionally perceived as legitimate may
constitute unlawful conduct as the traders’ algorithms and their design
features will come under greater scrutiny.14
On the other hand, there is great confusion in the trading industry
regarding the spoofing prohibition, generally due to the difficulty of
distinguishing spoofing from other similar but lawful conduct from a
theoretical and practical standpoint.15 Despite the rule’s simplistic
language, some critics are concerned with selective and discriminatory
enforcement that may emanate from the difficulties in detecting minor
incidents of spoofing in today’s vast global markets. Indeed, practical
issues such as limited access to order book data, technical difficulties in
developing proper detection systems, inconsistencies in the applicable
market rules, and the asymmetrical enforcement standards of the
responsible government and self-regulatory organizations have the
potential to undermine the fundamental premise of the spoofing
prohibition.16
13. See generally Michael Lewis, Crash Boys, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24, 2014),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-04-24/michael-lewis-has-questions-abo
ut-flash-crash [https://perma.cc/7374-N64K] (“On the day of the flash crash, Sarao never
actually sold stocks. He was trying to trick the market into falling so that he could buy in
more cheaply. But whom did he fool with his trick? Whose algorithms were so easily
gamed that they responded to phony sell orders by creating a crash? Stupidity isn’t a
crime. Still, it would be interesting to know who, at this particular poker table, on this
particular day, was the fool.”).
14. Regulation Automated Trading, 81 Fed. Reg. 85,334 (Nov. 25, 2016).
15. For a more in depth discussion of the vagueness issue, see Catriona Coppler, The
Anti-Spoofing Statute: Vague as Applied to the “Hypothetically Legitimate Trader”, 5
AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 261 (2016).
16. Coherence in market rules and enforcement policies undercut arbitrage-seeking
behavior and provide efficiencies in relation to compliance for all market participants.
For a theoretical analogy see NASSIM N. TALEB, SKIN IN THE GAME 30-31 (May 28, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/minority.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/B6D5-SAQL]. (“The Kosher population represents less than three tenth[s] of
[U.S. residents]. Yet, it appears that almost all drinks are Kosher. Why? Simply because
going full Kosher allows the producer, grocer, restaurant, to not have to distinguish
between Kosher and non-kosher for liquids, with special markers, separate aisles,
separate inventories, different stocking sub-facilities. . . . If the people following the
minority rule lived [in separation from the rest of the society], with their separate small
economy, then the minority rule would not apply. But, when a population has an even
spatial distribution, say the ratio of such a minority in a neighborhood is the same as that
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This Note, however, argues that the prohibition is a necessary step
towards improved market discipline and compliance standards, and fills
an important gap in the CEA by providing explicit statutory authority to
allow regulators to curb an activity that directly undermines the “efficient
market hypothesis” and poses systemic risks to markets.17 In the context
of wash sales, the courts have interpreted factors such as the specific
prohibition of wash sales by the CEA and the relatively easy identification
of wash sale activity as a legal basis that may potentially increase the
secondary liability risk of derivatives brokers.18 Applying the same
analogy to the spoofing context, it would be a fair assessment to say that
the explicit statutory prohibition, greater public awareness regarding
spoofing, and the increasing visibility of spoofing activity resulting from
improvements in the monitoring systems of regulators and market
operators will provide strong incentives for market participants to adapt
to changing norms.19 In this context, it is likely that the CFTC’s and the
SEC’s whistleblower programs will also incentivize independent market
observers and analysts to detect and report suspicious market conduct and
allow them to play a greater role in regulatory enforcement.
This Note first analyzes the normative elements of the new
prohibition in comparison with the CEA’s pre-Dodd-Frank antimanipulation authority. The Note then addresses the recent and ongoing
in the village, that in the village is the same as in the county, that in the county is the same
as that in state, and that in the state is the same as nationwide, then the (flexible) majority
will have to submit to the minority rule. Second, the cost structure matters quite a bit. It
happens in our first example that making lemonade compliant with Kosher laws doesn’t
change the price by much, not enough to justify inventories. But if the manufacturing of
Kosher lemonade cost substantially more, then the rule will be weakened in some
nonlinear proportion to the difference in costs. If it cost ten times as much to make Kosher
food, then the minority rule will not apply, except perhaps in some very rich
neighborhoods.”).
17. Bart Chilton, supra note 7; see also Sam Mamudi & Ryan Hoerger, Bats Wants
Permission to Crack Down on Spoofing Faster, BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2015), https://ww
w.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-30/bats-wants-permission-to-crack-down-onspoofing-faster-in-u-s- [https://perma.cc/2PUX-SL3S].
18. In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 187 (2d Cir. 2013)
(“Wash orders are explicitly banned by the CEA and, because they involve simultaneous
or shortly spaced transactions to buy and sell the same quantity of a commodity or stock,
they are much more recognizable to the broker transmitting them.”).
19. Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 1031,
1075 (2016).
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spoofing cases brought under the new statute, as well as other spoofing
cases brought by the CFTC, the SEC, market operators, and private
individuals under the pre-Dodd-Frank anti-manipulation provisions. The
Note also compares the spoofing statute with similar norms in the
securities area and delineates the divergence that is currently developing
between the fields of commodities and securities laws in relation to the
statutory requirements for a prima facie case of spoofing. Finally, the
Note argues that, despite the criticism, the spoofing prohibition serves an
important purpose and will play an integral role in improving market
discipline not only through public enforcement, but also through private
lawsuits, improved market monitoring, and self-regulatory actions.
I. FROM PRICE-MANIPULATION UNDER CEA TO A STAND-ALONE
CAUSE OF ACTION
Pre-Dodd-Frank actions against spoofing were generally brought as
claims of price manipulation20 or false reporting21 under the CEA.22 The
explicit illegality of spoofing under the CEA is new, but activities which
generally fall under spoofing have been prosecuted before by the SEC and
self-regulatory organizations under various general anti-manipulation

20. See 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(a)(1)-(2) (2012) (making it illegal to “offer to enter into,
enter into, or confirm the execution of a transaction” that “is used to cause any price to
be reported, registered, or recorded that is not a true and bona fide price”). Generally, the
CFTC required the following elements to be met: (i) offering to enter into the execution
of transactions; (ii) involving the purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery that;
(3) caused a price to be reported, registered, or recorded that was not true and bona fide.
Id.
21. See 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (prohibiting actions “caus[ing] [the
delivery/transmission of] false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports concerning
crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any
commodity in interstate commerce”).
22. See In re Bunge Glob. Mkts., Inc., CFTC No. 11-10 (Mar. 22, 2011)
(demonstrating a Pre-Dodd-Frank enforcement action where two traders entered and later
on cancelled orders for Chicago Board of Trade soybean futures at certain price levels
before the market opened causing an artificial alteration at the Indicative Opening Price);
Press Release, CFTC, Federal Court Orders Eric Moncada to Pay $1.56 Million Penalty
for Attempting to Manipulate the Wheat Futures Market (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7026-14 [https://perma.cc/AQ8S-2EV
M] (demonstrating a settlement for manipulation attempt).
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provisions found within the respective securities statutes and other
applicable market regulations.
A. CO-EXISTING NORMS
Spoofing actions share large commonalities with anti-manipulation
claims, but Dodd-Frank created a separate commodities spoofing cause
of action that has some overlaps with as well as differences from the
existing anti-manipulation norms.23 In fact, in its recent practice, the
CFTC has treated the concepts separately by formulating claims for both
price manipulation and spoofing independently in relation to the same
conduct.24 This represents a picture where the spoofing prohibition tends
to be treated by the regulators as a special form of manipulation, which
requires the showing of a certain statutorily defined trading pattern
sufficient to establish unlawful conduct.
Generally under the pre-Dodd-Frank manipulation standard, conduct
such as spoofing only amounted to price manipulation where (i) the
defendant had the ability to influence market prices; (ii) an artificial price
actually existed; (iii) the defendants caused the artificial prices; and (iv)
the defendants specifically intended to cause the artificial prices.25 In most
cases, the presence of actual causality and the existence of artificial prices
usually hinged on the same factual inquiry that would also determine
whether the more difficult to prove elements of the pre-Dodd-Frank

23. Generally, the question of whether a case will be tried based on the pre-DoddFrank price manipulation standard or the new spoofing prohibition depends on which rule
was in effect at the time of the trading activity.
24. See Consent Order, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 15-cv-3398 (E.D.
Ill. Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/docu
ments/legalpleading/enfsaraoorder111416.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN6L-9BX3]; Consent
Order, CFTC v. Heet Khara, No. 15 CV 03497 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016), http://w
ww.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfhee
tsalimorder033116.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PWG-73T2].
25. In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2013);
In re Shak, CFTC No. 14-03, 2013 WL 7085760 (Nov. 25, 2011); In re Pia, CFTC No.
11-17 (July 25, 2011); In re DiPlacido, CFTC No. 01-23, 2008 WL 4831204 (Nov. 5,
2008), aff’d in pertinent part, Di Placido v. CFTC, 364 Fed App’x 657 (2d Cir. 2009);
Complaint, CFTC v. Wilson, No. 13-CV-7884, 2013 WL 5940001 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6,
2013); Complaint, CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors L.L.C., No. 07-CV-6682, 2007 WL
2211181 (S.D.N.Y July 25, 2007).
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standard—“ability to influence market prices”26 and “specific intent to
influence market prices”—were met.27 The “specific intent” element
under the pre-Dodd-Frank standard purported to be the one that required
the most clarity, especially concerning whether the showing of specific
intent required something more than a general intent to affect market
prices.
B. WILSON CASE: SPOOFING DOES NOT NECESSARILY “SOUND IN
FRAUD”—ABILITY TO CAUSE AND THE EXISTENCE OF ARTIFICIAL PRICE
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Wilson—a highly
publicized spoofing case adjudicated under the pre-Dodd-Frank
authority—a district court in the Southern District of New York rejected
the defendant proprietary trading firm’s motion to dismiss, finding that
the CFTC had alleged facts sufficient to establish a price manipulation
claim under CEA Section 9(a)(2).28 The case involved the defendant’s
26. See DiPlacido v. CFTC, 364 F.App’x at 661 (“Even supposing that all large
traders in illiquid markets possess the ability to influence those markets, the
Commission’s inclusion of ‘the ability to influence the market price,’ rather than market
control, as an element of manipulation is hardly arbitrary or capricious, as three other
elements, including specific intent, must also be satisfied to establish liability. . . . The
Commission acted reasonably in concluding that DiPlacido had the ability to influence
prices where, on the relevant dates, his trades over two minutes at the Close accounted
for an average 14% of a full day’s volume.”).
27. CFTC v. Wilson, 27 F. Supp. 3d 517, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting In re Energy
Transfer Partners Nat. Gas Litig., 07 Civ. 3349, 2009 WL 2633781, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug.
26, 2009)) (“To meet the specific intent element of a claim for manipulation or attempted
manipulation of a futures contract, the Commission must plead that Defendants ‘acted
(or failed to act) with the purpose or conscious object of causing or effecting a price or
price trend in the market that did not reflect the legitimate forces of supply and
demand.’”).
28. Id. at 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The case related to the defendant’s activities that
took advantage of the so-called convexity bias/effect that occurs in the relevant market
during the market’s daily settlement. Id. at 523-25 (“The CFTC alleges
that DRW acquired its long position in order to take advantage of the convexity bias in
the Three–Month Contract and the fact that IDCH did not apply a PAI adjustment that
would counteract that bias . . . . In the months preceding its investment, DRW conducted
research into the methodology used by IDCH in generating the IDEX Curve and setting
the net present value of party’s open positions. In a July 23, 2010 email Wilson instructed
several of his subordinates to ‘[c]onfirm the contract has full convexity bias (despite the
fact they will force it to settle at non-convexity based prices)’ . . . . On August 30, 2010,
after DRW had begun to acquire its open position, a DRW trader stated that the Three–
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alleged spoofing in relation to an exchange-traded interest rate futures
contract called the IDEX USD Three-Month Interest Rate Swap Futures
Contract. In Wilson, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that a
spoofing claim based on the CEA’s anti-manipulation authority should be
subject to heightened pleading standards as applied to allegations that
“sound in fraud.”29 According to the court, “although manipulation and
attempted manipulation claims that ‘sound in fraud’ are evaluated under
the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) . . . fraud [is] not a
necessary element of a market manipulation claim.”30 In its decision, the
court accepted the CFTC’s theory of attempted manipulation as nonfraudulent misconduct that is “not based on misleading statements or
omissions, but rather on a particular trading strategy,” one that involved
“the timing of trades intended to change the closing price.”31 Indeed, for
the purposes of pleading standards, a similar conceptual separation
between allegations of explicit and implicit price manipulation is well
accepted in the securities law context.32 This approach is justified under

Month Contract is ‘flawed and we are working on taking advantage of the PAI/Convexity
flaw.’ According to the complaint, the same trader stated during
the CFTC’s investigation that, consistent with DRW’s goals, his role was to ‘buy as
much of this stuff as I could at prices that I thought were cheap because, yes, where I
thought they were valued . . . much higher.’” (citations omitted)).
29. Id. at 532 (citing CFTC v. Parnon Energy Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 233, 244
(S.D.N.Y. 2012)) (“[T]he weight of authority rejects this bright line rule in favor of a
case-by-case examination into whether the allegations do, in fact, ‘sound in fraud.’”).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 383 F. Supp. 2d 566, 579–80 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), supplemented on reconsideration, 399 F. Supp. 2d 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Market
manipulation cases are treated differently in large part because the method of generating
demand in the marketplace is secretive and difficult for an investor to detect. When wash
sales are used to increase trading volume and simulate greater demand for a security,
investors may be misled into believing that the rest of the market has discovered some
positive information, and is purchasing shares to take advantage of that implicit ‘good
news.’ . . . A necessary corollary of the efficient market hypothesis is that when an
investor observes heightened market activity and a rise in share prices, that investor relies
on market efficiency to support the assumption that new information has entered the
market. Thus, while misrepresentations affect investor beliefs firsthand—by directly
injecting false information into the marketplace—market manipulation affects beliefs
indirectly by creating circumstantial evidence that positive information has entered the
market. When secret manipulation affects beliefs indirectly, courts understand that it may
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the efficient market hypothesis, which holds that “public information is
immediately incorporated into . . . price.”33 Spoofing, as a special form of
implicit price manipulation, involves market manipulation by way of
directly distorting the market price via sending non-bona fide orders to an
exchange (as opposed to misrepresentations involving public statements
and events). Accordingly, courts usually lower the pleading standard due
to the subtle form of the alleged manipulation and the potentially onerous
evidentiary challenges in meeting the burden of heightened pleading
standards.34
Here, the court held that the CFTC’s allegations passed the necessary
pleading standards in establishing both the ability to influence market
prices35 and the specific intent to do so, based on an investigation that
showed that the firm’s management deliberately studied and executed the
relevant market arbitrage opportunity.36 When defining the “existence of
artificial prices,” the court borrowed a test from antitrust doctrine that
defines the element broadly as any price that “does not reflect basic forces

be more difficult for plaintiffs to outline the scheme with great particularity; thus, market
manipulation plaintiffs are given more leeway in alleging manipulative conduct.”).
33. Id. at 579 (citing In re Exec. Telecard, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 1021, 1028
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)) (“Under the efficient market hypothesis endorsed by the plurality in
Basic v. Levinson, the price of a security reflects all publicly available information.”).
34. Id.
35. See Wilson, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 533. “[T]he CFTC has alleged that the head of
quantitative research at DRW acknowledged that DRW could influence prices, stating
that as a result of Defendants’ practices, the ‘IDCG settle curve is DRW defined.’” Id. at
532.
36. Id. (“The CFTC alleges that DRW’s head of quantitative research stated to
Wilson that as a result of DRW’s ‘“new regime,” the ‘“IDCG settle curve
is DRW defined.”’ Id. ¶ 53. The CFTC has also alleged that another market participant
complained to DRW in February 2011 that DRW ‘“get[s] to set the mark,”’ and
that DRW continued its allegedly manipulative bidding activity through August
2011. . . . Defendants also maintain that their bids were ‘based on their own calculations
and beliefs about value’ and, therefore, that the requisite intent was lacking. Def. Mem.
15–16. Although Defendants may attempt to prove at a later stage of the litigation that
their bids reflected a ‘legitimate source of demand,’ see id., this issue is not appropriate
for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage. With respect to both the manipulation and
attempted manipulation claims, the CFTC has alleged facts capable of showing that
Defendants specifically intended to influence the market price of the Three–Month
Contract.”).
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of supply and demand.”37 Thus, the tests for showing the necessary ability
to cause artificial prices and the existence of artificial prices have
metastasized into a single inquiry for purposes of a motion to dismiss.38
This was contrary to a Southern District of Texas court decision that
found the pre-Dodd-Frank anti-manipulation standard—and its condition
regarding the existence of an artificial price—unconstitutionally vague as
applied to certain defendants.39 Some of the evidence factored in by the
Wilson court included the duration of the relevant trading activity (the
defendant adopted spoofing for more than 118 days without entering into
an actual trade) and other facts and circumstances surrounding the
defendant’s trading behavior.40 The court took into account the excessive
price differences resulting from the defendant’s bids, and the rapid order
withdrawals by the defendant during the settlement period when the
market became particularly exposed to this trading strategy due to the
convexity bias.41 The court found the defendant’s arguments defending its
conduct as lawful arbitrage activity that actually served to correct the
market price unpersuasive.42 The evidence was sufficient to meet the
“causality” standard for deciding on the motion to dismiss.43 Thus, the
case is a reminder of the wide traction the spoofing prohibition had
achieved even in the pre-Dodd-Frank regime. This is particularly striking
37. Id. at 533 (quoting CFTC v. Parnon Energy Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 233, 245
(S.D.N.Y. 2012)) (“[M]arket manipulation in its various manifestations is implicitly an
artificial stimulus applied to (or at times a brake on) market prices, a force which distorts
those prices, a factor which prevents the determination of those prices by free competition
alone.”).
38. Parnon Energy Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d at 245 (citing Pepsico, Inc. v. Coca-Cola,
315 F.3d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2002)) (“By analogy to antitrust law, where an element of
proof involves the ability to affect prices, a complaint is sufficient if it alleges ‘direct
measurements of a defendant’s ability to control prices . . . .’”).
39. United States v. Radley, 659 F. Supp. 2d 803, 813–14 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d,
632 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The government fails in this regard because the definition
of ‘artificial’ is uncertain, and that uncertainty makes application of the manipulation
statute unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case. . . . Today’s markets
are filled with speculators attempting to make profits based on movement in prices of
commodities and other products with no intention of ever consuming or producing them.
That is what the defendants were doing in this case, and there is no law or case which
prohibits speculation.”).
40. Wilson, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 533–34.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 535.
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as the pre-Dodd-Frank anti-manipulation authority subjected spoofing
claims to particularly difficult prima facie case standards of archetypical
price manipulation cases.
II. POST-DODD-FRANK STANDARD: INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR SPOOFING
Section 747 of Dodd-Frank adopted three separate commodities
offenses in relation to all commodities trading activity occurring in
regulated markets. These offenses include (i) “violating bids or offers;”
(ii) “intentional or reckless disregard for the orderly execution of
transactions during the closing period;” and (iii) all conduct that “is of the
character of, or is commonly known to the trade ‘spoofing’ (bidding or
offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution).”44
Section 747 also further amended Section 4c(a) of the CEA to grant broad
authority to the CFTC to promulgate such “rules and regulations as, in the
judgment of the Commission, are reasonably necessary to prohibit the
trading practices” enumerated in Section 747 together with “any other
trading practice that is disruptive of fair and equitable trading.”45
The new prohibition will lower the prima facie case threshold in
price manipulation claims involving spoofing since it does not require the
showing of “specific intent” and the existence of or the ability to cause
artificial prices. Prior to Dodd-Frank, spoofing cases brought under the
general price manipulation statute had to show specific intent to

44. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5) (2012). Although this paper focuses on spoofing, CEA
Section 4(c)(a)(5) also makes it illegal to “violate bids and offers” under a strict liability
standard (to buy or sell any contract for prices except the lower/highest available offer/bid
prices), see id. § 6c(a)(5)(A), and other activities that demonstrate intentional or reckless
trading patterns during the closing period of markets (an activity commonly referred to
as “banging the close”). See id. § 6c(a)(5)(B). According to the CFTC, the rule against
“violating bids and offers” does not introduce a “best execution standard across multiple
markets,” and the trader’s obligation regarding the rule is limited to the confines of the
specific trading venue utilized at a given moment of time. See Antidisruptive Practices
Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,943, 14,946 (proposed Mar. 18, 2011). The CFTC also stated
this prohibition shall apply primarily in trading environments where a person exercises
at least some control over the selection of bids and offers, and shall generally not apply
when the trading occurs on an electronic trading system where bid matching occurs
automatically. See id.
45. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(6) (2012).
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manipulate the market price.46 For conduct that occurred following the
enactment of Dodd-Frank, the claimants will need to show specific
intention only with regards to the spoofing activity, viz., sending orders
without having a bona fide intent to enter into actual transactions. The
statutory prohibition will function as a gap-filler by establishing three
important legal assumptions: (i) that spoofing is a per se form of price
manipulation, (ii) that price manipulation is a primary motive for the
perpetrator of spoofing, and (iii) that it is generally irrelevant whether the
perpetrator had the actual ability to manipulate the market price. In cases
where the defendant’s bid-offer practices establish a consistent pattern
indicating a conscious effort to avoid entering into any transactions, the
requisite intent element can be easily met, unlike the onerous prima facie
case standard of the classical price manipulation cases.47 On the other
hand, as is discussed below, the enactment of the spoofing statute seems
to have created a divergence between the anti-manipulation standards in
commodities and securities laws, since as of yet, there is no explicit
statutory prohibition in securities laws against spoofing.
Since its enactment, the new spoofing statute was thus far upheld
against constitutional challenges for vagueness. Courts rejected this
challenge, since, when taken together with the relevant guidance issued
by the CFTC, the statute provided a sufficient definition in declaring
spoofing an unlawful conduct.48
46.
47.

See supra Section I.A.
In United States v. Coscia, the relevant jury instruction focused on the intent
element without requiring the showing of other elements of prima facie price
manipulation. United States v. Coscia, 177 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1094 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“The
instruction the Court ultimately adopted reads, in relevant part: ‘Spoofing’ is defined as
bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution. To find this
element satisfied, you must find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that, at the time Mr. Coscia entered the bid or offer specified in the Count that you
are considering, he intended to cancel the entire bid or offer before it was executed, and
that he did not place the bid or offer as part of a legitimate, good-faith attempt to execute
at least part of that bid or offer.”).
48. See United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 656 (N.D. Ill. 2015); see also
CFTC v. Oystacher, No. 15-CV-9196, 2016 WL 4439945, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2016)
(“Defendants essentially assert three arguments: i) the Spoofing Statute is
unconstitutionally vague, ii) CFTC Regulation 180.1 is unconstitutionally vague, and ii)
the Spoofing Statute constitutes an unconstitutional delegation by Congress. The Court
disagrees with all three.”); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982) (“[E]conomic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness
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A. CFTC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE
The CFTC did not issue any final rules regarding spoofing.49
However, the agency sought public comments on various questions
regarding the new prohibition and issued a proposed interpretive order,
interpretive guidance, and policy statement to guide the industry on its
interpretation of Section 4c(a)(5)(C).50 Since the enactment of the
prohibition, the CFTC has avoided narrowing the scope of spoofing into
a pre-defined set of market behavior. Instead it has adopted a case-specific
approach heavily reliant on particular facts and circumstances of the
suspect market behavior.51
1. Something More Than Recklessness
According to CFTC interpretation, the statute requires a market
participant “to act with some degree of intent, or scienter, beyond
recklessness” for his conduct to constitute a breach of the CEA’s spoofing
prohibition.52 Different than the strict liability standard accepted for
“violat[ion of] bids and offers,” the statutory language of spoofing
requires a showing of “intent to cancel a bid or offer before execution,”
and the CFTC has stated that a showing of something greater than
“reckless trading, practices, or conduct” is necessary to establish a

test because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face
economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant
legislation in advance of action. Indeed, the regulated enterprise may have the ability to
clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative
process.”).
49. Regarding other CEA anti-manipulation provisions, the agency has adopted
Prohibition on the Deployment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398 (July 14,
2011).
50. See Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890 (May 28, 2013);
Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,943 (proposed Mar. 18, 2011);
Antidisruptive Practices Authority Contained in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 67,301, 67,302 (proposed Nov. 2, 2010)
(requesting comments as part of advance notice of proposed).
51. In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 184 (2d Cir. 2013)
(“[L]arge positions can be indicative either of manipulation or of excessive
speculation.”); Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,896.
52. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,896.
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violation.53 Generally, a violation will not exist if the cancellation of the
bid or offer was “part of a legitimate, good-faith attempt to consummate
a trade.”54 In relation to “partial fills,” the agency abstained from
declaring a bright line rule and generally stated that it shall conduct a
facts-and-circumstances test based on an evaluation of the greater “market
context,” “the person’s pattern of trading activity,” and other factors when
distinguishing between legitimate trading and spoofing.55
On July 14, 2011, the CFTC also adopted CFTC Regulation
180.1(a)(1) pursuant to its authority under Section 753 of Dodd-Frank.56
In relevant part, 180.1(a)(1) makes it
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in connection with any
swap, or contract of sale of any commodity . . ., or contract for future
delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, to
intentionally or recklessly . . . [u]se or employ, or attempt to use or
employ, any manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.57

In spoofing cases, CFTC generally relies on both Rule 180.1 and the
statutory provision.
Under commodities laws, scienter generally requires “the intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”58 Generally, a successful scienter
pleading alleges facts showing that the defendants had motive and
opportunity to commit the fraud, or alternatively, provides strong
circumstantial evidence of “conscious misbehavior or recklessness.”59 To
sufficiently plead illegitimate motives, a plaintiff should present concrete

53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.; see also United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 656 (rejecting the
argument that the rule’s application is ambiguous in relation to partial fills).
56. Prohibition on the Deployment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,400.
57. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(1) (2017); see also CFTC v. Oystacher, No. 15-CV-9196,
2016 WL 3693429, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2016).
58. In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 612 F. Supp. 2d 376, 383
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 730 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013); see also id. at 383 n.20 (quoting
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007)) (“Although the
Supreme Court was discussing securities fraud, its language is equally applicable to
commodities fraud.”).
59. Id. (citation omitted).
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benefits “that could be realized by one or more of the false statements and
wrongful nondisclosures alleged.”60
2. Relevant Markets and Transactions
The spoofing prohibition covers all bids and offers on products
traded on all registered entities, including bids and offers made in preopen periods or during other trading stoppages.61 Pursuant to Section
2(a)(1)(C)(ii) of the CEA, futures contracts on broad-based security
indexes also fall within provisions of CEA, together with futures on
narrow-based security indexes, which are jointly regulated by the CFTC
and the SEC.
The agency further declared that a violation of the spoofing
prohibition could occur in any trading platform, regardless of whether the
platform operates on “order book functionality,” so long as the
participants have the ability to send executable orders or transact against
pending orders.62 According to the agency’s interpretation, examples of

60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.; see also In re Bunge Global Markets, Inc., CFTC No. 11-10 (Mar. 22, 2011).
Amaranth, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 383. For a background on different market
structures, see Charlie X. Cai et al., Trading Frictions and Market Structure: An
Empirical Analysis, 35 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 563, 564-65 (2008) (“Consistent with earlier
studies . . . our initial results suggest that the total cost of trading is lower on order driven
systems. There is no doubt that for liquid securities the real cost of trading is lower
because of increased order and competition from public investors (through limit order
placement) for the provision of liquidity. However, our analysis also indicates that
informational asymmetry is significantly higher on order driven systems, which could
possibly be due to the anonymity of market participants (and counterparties to
transactions) or stealth trading by informed investors. Significantly, order size has a
major impact upon the level of informational and real frictions and medium trades have
very high informational costs compared to small and large trades.”); see also James J. D.
Wang & S. Viswanathan, Market Architecture: Limit Order Books Versus Dealership
Markets 2 (Aug. 1998) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf
m?abstract_id=135852 [https://perma.cc/676P-VJ7D ] (“(1) [A] risk neutral customer
prefers to trade in a limit-order market instead of in any hybrid or dealership markets; (2)
a risk averse customer prefers to trade in a dealership market over a limitorder book market when the number of market makers is large and when the variation
in order size is significant; and (3) for risk averse customers, the hybrid market structure,
when properly structured, dominates the dealership market.”). See also generally
Stanislav Dolgopolov, The Maker-Taker Pricing Model and Its Impact on the Securities
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spoofing include (i) “submitting or cancelling bids or offers to overload
the quotation system of a registered entity,” (ii) “submitting or cancelling
bids or offers to delay another person’s execution of trades,” (iii)
“submitting or cancelling multiple bids or offers to create an appearance
of false market depth,” and (iv) “submitting or canceling bids or offers
with intent to create artificial price movements upwards or downwards.”63
Although spoofing has been previously prohibited by self-regulatory
organizations, such prohibition was based on general conduct rules.
Following the CFTC releases, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(“CME”) and Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”) incorporated into their
rules the above listed activities that the CFTC declared as examples of
spoofing.64 The CME and ICE rules also expressly prohibit the entry of
orders with the intent to modify them “to avoid execution.”65
B. COSCIA CASE: INTENT TO SPOOF—CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
PROHIBITION
The new prohibition was first tested following an enforcement action
brought by the CFTC, in which the Commissioners ordered an energy
trading company and its sole owner executing high frequency trading
strategies to pay a monetary fine for breaching the prohibition.66
Market Structure: A Can of Worms for Securities Fraud?, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 231
(2014).
63. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890, 31,896, (May 28,
2013).
64. CHI. MERCANTILE EXCH., MARKET REGULATION ADVISORY NOTICE: DISRUPTIVE
PRACTICES PROHIBITED (2014); ICE FUTURES U.S., INC., TRADING RULES 4.02(l) (2012).
The CME rule also identifies various conduct that would not be deemed spoofing such
as an “order, entered with the intent to execute a bona fide transaction, that is
subsequently modified or cancelled due to a perceived change in circumstances;” an
“unintentional, accidental, or ‘fat-finger’ order;” and a bona fide stop-loss order. CHI.
MERCANTILE EXCH., supra, at 4-5.
65. CHI. MERCANTILE EXCH., supra note 64, at 2; ICE FUTURES U.S., INC., supra
note 64, at 4.02(l).
66. In re Panther Energy Trading LLC, CFTC No. 13-26, 2013 WL 3817473, at *2
(July 22, 2013) (“First, the algorithm placed a relatively small order on one side of the
market at or near the best price being offered to buy or sell, in this instance a sell order
for 17 contracts at a price of $85.29 per barrel, which was a lower price than the contracts
then being offered by other market participants. Thus, the Respondents’ offer was at the
lowest, i.e.[,] best, offered price. Second, within a fraction of a second, the Respondents
entered orders to buy a relatively larger number of Light Sweet Crude Oil futures
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Subsequently the sole owner of the company was found guilty by a jury
for commodities fraud, as the Northern District of Illinois court rejected
a motion for a new trial.67 In doing so, the court rejected arguments that a
high number of order cancellations is an inherent and natural part of
hyper-frequency trading and that the spoofing prohibition is
unconstitutionally vague by failing to provide guidance regarding partial
fills.68 The court also paid particular focus to evidence regarding the
trading program and the programmer’s testimony regarding the program’s
design, including its special features such as the placement of large quote
orders to “stimulate the market,” the cancellation of large orders as soon
as they started to fill, and a timer mechanism that was set on quote orders
to avoid entering into any transactions.69 By holding that statutory
authority regarding spoofing provides a proper definition for the unlawful
conduct, the court also distinguished the case from prior case law where
defendants prevailed in challenges brought against certain language in the

contracts at progressively higher prices: the first bid at $85.26, the second bid at $85.27,
and the third bid at $85.28. The prices of Respondents’ bids were higher than the contracts
then being bid by other market participants. Thus, Respondents’ placed their bids at the
highest, i.e.[,] best[] prices. By placing the large buy orders, Respondents sought to give
the market the impression that there was significant buying interest, which suggested that
prices would soon rise, raising the likelihood that other market participants would buy
the 17 lots the Respondents were then offering to sell. Although Respondents wanted to
give the impression of buy-side interest, Respondents entered the large buy orders with
the intent that these buy orders be canceled before the orders were actually executed.”).
67. United States v. Coscia, 177 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1090 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
68. Id. at 1092-93. The court discussed the vagueness argument in depth in its prior
opinion. See United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 657 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
(“According to Coscia, the ongoing debate surrounding the meaning of spoofing
‘illustrates the crucial point that the status of Mr. Coscia’s alleged conduct was an open
question from the outset.’ (Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 28, at 24.) At the time of the alleged
trades, September 2011, the only available interpretation of the statute was the CFTC’s
proposed, nonbinding guidance. Even if this guidance had been binding, Coscia argues
that his conduct was not encompassed by any of the three examples provided.”).
69. Coscia, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 1087. (“[Government] introduced evidence, for
example, suggesting that Coscia placed many more large quote orders than other traders,
and then cancelled them at an unusually high rate (on one exchange at a rate of 99%).
(Trial Tr. 299-300; Govt. Exs. ICE Summ. Charts 2-3.) The fact that some of his large
orders were partially filled may have been a result of an imperfect program, as the
Government points out—at least, the jury was entitled to believe so.”).
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CEA.70 Under the CFTC guidance that was issued recently, the
defendant’s arguments based upon general uncertainty in the public about
the scope of the spoofing activity were unconvincing.71 The court
emphasized the significance of the intent element in distinguishing
between spoofing and bona fide Fill-Kill and partial-fill orders.72
C. OYSTACHER CASE: THRESHOLD FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF—INTENT
REVISITED
In Oystacher, the alleged spoofing act did not involve automatized
trading via algorithms, but rather involved manually conducted trading
activity.73 Remarkably, the relevant enforcement action was based on
complaints from various industry insiders, including well-known highfrequency trading firm Citadel, whose traders detected the defendant’s
suspicious activity in the E-Mini Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Price Index
Futures Contracts market (“ES Market”) with their own resources.74 ES

70. Id.; see Stoller v. CFTC, 834 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1987) (“wash sales”); United
States v. Radley, 659 F. Supp. 2d 803 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 632 F.3d
177 (5th Cir. 2011) (“manipulate”); United States v. La Mantia, 2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 20,667 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 1978) (“fictitious sales”).
71. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 659 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“Congress had not defined the
challenged term in the statute. In contrast, § 6(a)(C)(5) provides a definition of
‘spoofing.’”).
72. Id. (“Coscia’s alleged ‘intent to cancel’ sets his conduct apart from the legitimate
trading practices described in his memorandum. The conduct in the Indictment involves
the entry of large-volume orders with the intent to ‘immediately cancel.’”).
73. CFTC v. Oystacher, No. 15-CV-9196, 2016 WL 3693429, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July
12, 2016) (“Defendant Oystacher is a manual trader. (Tr. at 928.) As such, he manually
executes trades based on his own observations. (Id. at 928-29.) To aid his manual trading,
he uses a computer mouse that places pre-configured contract quantities depending on
which buttons he clicks. (Id. at 966-67.) Specifically, the left button on Defendant
Oystacher’s mouse submits larger orders, while the right button submits smaller orders.
(Id.) These amounts vary depending on which markets Defendant Oystacher trades in.
(Id. at 967.) In addition, Defendant Oystacher utilizes a ‘randomizer tool’ that randomizes
the contract quantities he orders by either adding or subtracting a small amount each time
he places an order.”).
74. Id. at *3 (“The defendant’s suspect activities spanned into the Commodity
Exchange, Inc.’s High Grade Copper Futures Contracts market in December 2011, the
New York Mercantile Exchange’s Light Sweet Crude Oil Futures Contracts market in
May 2012, the NYMEX’s Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures Contracts market in
November and December 2012, the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s Volatility Index
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Market is “one of the most liquid equity index futures in the world,” and
Citadel was “one of the largest traders in the world on the ES market.”75
The company’s traders observed what they believed to be spoofing in
May 2013 when Citadel’s profitability started to decline, and as a result,
it was forced to unwind its participation in the ES market by over 50%.76
Subsequently, the company started to investigate market data and develop
a program to detect extreme order patterns, such as “instances of large
order cancellations followed by quick trades on the opposite side at the
same price.”77 There were also investigations filed against the defendant
by NYMEX, COMEX, CME, ICE, and EUREX.78
To decide whether to grant the CFTC’s requests for injunctive action
to bar the defendant from trading, in a highly publicized eight-day
hearing, the court heard testimonies from the representatives of domestic
and international hyper-frequency trading firms, exchanges, regulatory
authorities, and academic experts.79 The issue was whether the CFTC met
its burden to show a statutory violation, and whether “there [was] a
reasonable likelihood of future violations” that would justify the
injunction.80 The court rejected the defendant’s argument for a heightened
standard of proof in reaching its decision regarding the preliminary
injunction. In doing so, the court categorized spoofing and price
manipulation claims separately from other claims of fraud by refusing to
adopt the Second Circuit’s heightened standard for similar claims in
securities laws.81
Futures Contracts market in February and March 2013, the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange’s E-Mini Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Price Index Futures Contracts market
in June and December 2013 and January 2014, and the CME’s Ten Year T-Note Treasury
Futures market in February 2016.”).
75. Id. at *9.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *10 (“Specifically, Citadel’s Pull-Swipe Detector flagged order entries
where 1) over fifty percent of the total display size on one side of the market was
cancelled just before 2) a trade of at least two hundred contracts was entered on the
opposite side—a ‘fairly large trade’ relative to the ‘size showing at the top of the book,’
according to Mr. May. (Id. at 28-29.)”).
78. Id. at *19.
79. Id.
80. Id. at *6.
81. Id. at *7 (“A number of other circuits have opted not to follow Unifund, instead
applying the default standard the Seventh Circuit employs. See SEC v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1,
8 (1st Cir. 2002) (refusing to apply the Second Circuit’s statutory-injunction standard as
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The court also addressed and rejected the argument that the
prohibition lacked an “intelligible principle” and therefore was an
unconstitutional delegation of power to the CFTC and federal courts.82
The court summarized the relevant constitutional law principles that
govern Congress’ authority to obtain assistance in the function of its
legislative duties, the legislative history of Dodd-Frank, and the authority
granted to the CFTC for interpreting and enforcing the CEA, as well as
its various rulemaking powers.83
The manual spoofing activity in Oystacher consisted of “large (at
least doubling the number of contracts offered or bid at those price levels,
or better) passive order(s) on one side of the market at or near the best bid
or offer price, which were intended to be canceled before execution.”84
To complete the scheme, the defendant would then
cancel or attempt to cancel all of the spoof order(s) before they were
executed and virtually simultaneously “flip” [its] position from buy to
sell (or vice versa) by placing at least one aggressive order on the other
side of the market at the same or better price to trade with market
participants that had been induced to enter the market by the spoof
orders they just canceled.85

defined in Unifund) (citing Unifund, 910 F.2d at 1036-37); see also CFTC v. Hunter Wise
Commodities, LLC, 749 F.3d 967, 974 (11th Cir. 2014) (‘Binding precedent in this circuit
suggests, and other circuits have held, that where the [CFTC] seeks to enjoin future
violations, it must also show a reasonable likelihood of future violations in addition to a
prima facie case of illegality.’)”); CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Grp., 680 F.2d 573, 582 n.16
(9th Cir. 1982). It should be also noted that the S.D.N.Y. refused to apply the heightened
pleading standard to the spoofing claims both in Wilson and Tower Research, since a
price manipulation claim does not necessarily entail a claim of fraud in the strict sense
regardless of the plaintiff’s formulation of its arguments. See Myun-Uk Choi v. Tower
Research Capital LLC, 165 F. Supp. 3d 42, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The Wilson court
decided that, because the attempted manipulation was effectuated through ‘a particular
trading strategy’ and did not involve ‘misleading statements or omissions,’ the complaint
did not sound in fraud and therefore should be evaluated under the ‘flexible pleading
standard[ ] of Rule 8(a)’ rather than the more stringent standard of Rule 9(b). Id. at 532.
The Court finds Wilson’s reasoning persuasive.”).
82. CFTC v. Oystacher, No. 15-CV-9196, 2016 WL 4439945, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
23, 2016).
83. Id.
84. Oystacher, 2016 WL 3693429, at *1.
85. Id. at *4 (“The CFTC’s Complaint . . . charges Defendants with (1) spoofing the
futures market in violation of Section 4c(a)(5)(C) of the CEA and (2) employing a
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During the hearings, the court heard expert testimony from Professor
Bessembinder who was hired by the CFTC in 2014 to study market data
(limited order book data that is visible to market participants) and the
order data (the more comprehensive and less accessible log of entire
market activity) in relation to potential spoofing. One of the study
methods used by Professor Bessembinder was primarily concentrated on
“flip” patterns in the defendant’s trading.86 A flip is “a cancellation of an
order [that was] followed by an opposite side order entry within 0.005
seconds and at the same or better price.”87 According to Professor
Bessembinder, a flip is usually a very rare phenomenon that is never
observed in almost 99% of the accounts trading in the relevant markets.88
The defendant ultimately had more than 28,000 orders that fitted the
“flipping pattern” definition.89 The court also accounted for the
defendant’s cancellations in terms of quantity90 and their percentage of
the total order number. However, despite this evidence, the court
ultimately rejected the CFTC’s request to bar the defendant from trading
due to the CFTC’s failure to provide sufficient evidence that the
defendant’s unlawful conduct would continue.91 Although the court
voiced concerns regarding the defendant’s suspect activities that
continued despite several investigations by various market operators, the
court refused to issue an injunction, since the efforts of the defendant’s

manipulative device, scheme, or artifice in violation of Section 6(c)(1) of the CEA and
CFTC Regulation 180.1.”).
86. Id. at *23.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *25 (“In other words, Defendant Oystacher’s cancellations at the flip were
larger than other participants’ in both absolute size and relative share of total entered
orders. Defendant Oystacher cancelled 36.9 percent of his Natural Gas contracts, for
example, while all other participants combined cancelled only 0.3 percent. (R. 134, CFTC
Exh. 95, at 12.) He cancelled 35.2, 33.4, and 25.7 percent of his VIX, Crude Oil, and
Copper contracts, respectively, while the rest of participants in those markets cancelled
0.1 percent in all three. (Id.) Finally, during December 2013 and January 2014, Defendant
Oystacher cancelled 29.5 percent of his ES contracts, and all other market participants
cancelled only 0.6 percent.”).
91. Id. at *39 (“Importantly, ‘past misconduct does not lead necessarily to the
conclusion that there is a likelihood of future misconduct[.]’ While past misconduct can
be ‘highly suggestive of the likelihood of future violations, ... the court should look to the
“totality of the circumstances”’ before drawing any inferences.” (citations omitted)).
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compliance officer in implementing and enforcing restrictions on trading
size and speed were sufficient to render the trading ban unnecessary.92 It
was reported in October 2016 that the CFTC had agreed, in principle, to
a settlement with the defendant.93
D. SARAO AND OTHERS: EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION, COLLECTIVE
SPOOFING
The CFTC has reached successful settlements in several spoofingrelated enforcement actions against traders located overseas.94 The
enforcement case against Sarao was brought under the pre-Dodd-Frank
authority. The U.K.-resident defendant was found to have conducted
spoofing over a long span in the E-mini S&P futures market—including
during the day of the infamous flash crash.95 The defendant operated a
92. Id. at *42 (“Defendants have implemented, among others, the ‘Dynamic Max
Quantity at Price Tool’ and the ‘Delayed Replace for Cancel/Replace Tool’—compliance
tools to self-monitor and regulate Defendant Oystacher’s trading size and speed,
respectively. Importantly, these two trading characteristics are fundamental to
Defendants’ ability to violate the relevant statutes and regulations, enhancing the
effectiveness of Defendants’ discontinuance. All of the compliance tools Defendants
have self-implemented are adverse to their interests. These tools aim to prevent
Defendant Oystacher from successfully engaging in a ‘bait and switch flipping
scheme.’”).
93. Janan Hanna, CFTC Settling Suit Against 3Red’s Accused Spoofer Oystacher,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-19/cft
c-reaches-settlement-with-3red-s-accused-spoofer-oystacher [https://perma.cc/BR68-W
5GB].
94. Consent Order, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 15-cv-3398 (E.D. Ill.
Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documen
ts/legalpleading/enfsaraoorder111416.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8EB-TZJH]; Consent
Order, CFTC v. Khara, No. 15 CV 03497 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016) http://www.cft
c.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfheetsalimo
rder033116.pdf [https://perma.cc/R75A-ZPMD].
95. Consent Order, Nav Sarao, supra note 94, at 11-12 (“During the Relevant Period,
on average: it took only 500 milliseconds for the Dynamic Layering Program’s layered
sell orders to move in unison and in symmetry with the market price after a change (either
up or down) in market price. Defendants’ layered sell orders contained approximately
2,000 sell orders (at multiple price levels), with a combined average face value of
approximately $128,615,160. The Dynamic Layering Program was active approximately
7 minutes at a time, and, when active, the E-mini S&P prices dropped, on average, more
than 1 tick. Defendants’ Genuine Executed Orders were at least 1. 7 times more profitable
per contract traded when the Dynamic Layering Program was active than when no Spoof
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“dynamic layering algorithm” using his own personal computer, which
enabled him to deceive the market participants about the real market
price. The evidence in the case demonstrates how an individual trader
with modest technical resources can hold significant disruptive power in
one of the most liquid markets when he consciously and consistently
employs disruptive order strategies. The case also reflects the growing
extraterritorial reach of U.S. commodities regulation.96
Similarly, in Khara, an enforcement action was brought against an
individual trader and his introducing broker, both residents of the United
Arab Emirates, for concerted spoofing activity (both as a principal and as
an accomplice) regarding trade orders in the CME Globex Gold futures
market.97 The case demonstrates how spoofing can be executed by the
concerted actions of more than a single trader.98 The enforcement action
Orders were active. During the Relevant Period, only 90 of the Defendants’ 19,888
layered sell orders were even partially executed. During the Relevant Period, Defendants
profited at least $9,667,258.22 as a result of the Dynamic Layering Program.”).
96. However, in Tower Research, a class action claim brought by Korean individuals
against a U.S. resident for spoofing in a Korean stock index futures traded on CME
Globex located in Illinois, the S.D.N.Y. granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for
failure to state sufficient contacts with the U.S. See Myun-Uk Choi v. Tower Research
Capital LLC, 165 F. Supp. 3d 42, 49-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). In its Morrison analysis, due
to the organizational separation between the CME (a domestic exchange) and the CME
Globex, the court treated CME Globex “not as a domestic exchange but rather . . . simply
a technological platform utilized by other exchanges to effectuate trading.” Id. at 50.
97. Consent Order, Khara, supra note 94.
98. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 6-7, Khara, No. 15 CV 03497 (JPO)
(S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2015) (“For example, on April 28, 2015, Defendant Salim had an order
for Gold futures on one side of the book. Defendant Khara entered layered orders on the
opposite side of the book as Defendant Salim’s orders, which caused COMEX market
participants to fill Defendant Salim’s orders. After Defendant Salim’s orders were filled,
Defendant Khara cancelled his layered orders. An example of the coordinated effort to
engage in spoofing is as follows: On April 27, 2015, at 05:49:37.957 a.m. Central
Standard Time, Salim placed one 3-lot bid in the June 2015 Gold futures contract at the
second book level (price of 11817). Approximately three seconds later, at 05:49:40.725
a.m., Khara began to enter 5-lot offers. Between 05:49:40.725 and 05:49:43.725 a.m.,
Khara entered 17 5-lot offers for a total sell side exposure of 85 contracts. The offers
were entered in descending price starting at 11820 through 11818. One millisecond after
entering the fourteenth 5-lot offer (05:49:43.420 a.m.) all contracts of Salim’s bid traded
(05:49:43:421). After this sequence, Khara cancelled all of his offers. Based on this
conduct, Market Regulation conducted a review of Defendants’ accounts, for the period
of March 1, 2015 to April 29, 2015, in the April 2015 Gold, June 2015 Gold and May
2015 Silver contracts. During the Relevant Period, Defendants Khara and Salim appeared
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was predicated by the CME Group’s identification and reporting of the
misconduct, including suspending the defendants’ accounts and notifying
the regulators. It also shows how, regardless of order sizes, spoofing
activity can be detected if properly monitored by market operators.99
E. SELF-REGULATORY ACTIONS; PRIVATE ACTIONS AND ANONYMOUS
DEFENDANTS; WHISTLEBLOWER REPORTS
In the enforcement of the law and regulatory rules relating to
technically sophisticated hyper-frequency trading activities, the practical
constraints necessitate greater involvement of exchanges in the policing
of suspicious trading activities.100 Proponents of structural reform argue
that instead of emphasizing ex post enforcement of abstract and
complicated laws and regulations, the reform efforts must focus on
revising and developing market structures, which will restrain or
eliminate manipulative activity by their own design.101 Therefore,
policies, procedures, and technological tools developed by the exchanges
hold great importance in reaching an efficient equilibrium between public
and private regulation due to the exchanges’ primary positions as the dayto-day enablers and managers of the trading infrastructure.102
In recognition of its greater role in this regard, the CME Group
brought sixteen cases related to spoofing before the CME Business
Conduct Committee in 2015—a substantial increase from the number of
such cases in 2014.103 These cases were generally brought under Rules

to routinely place large aggregate quantities opposite smaller orders that would then
trade, and then the large orders would be cancelled. On information and belief, Khara
traded more than 300 futures contracts as a result of Salim’s large opposite-side exposure,
and Salim traded more than 150 futures contracts as a result of Khara’ s large opposite
side exposure.”).
99. See id.
100. Yesha Yedav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA L. REV. 1032,
1090 (2016).
101. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100
NW. U. L. REV. 655, 656–75 (2006).
102. Yedav, supra note 100, at 1090.
103. Matthew Leising, Spoofing Went Mainstream in 2015, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21,
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-22/nabbing-the-rogue-algo-in
side-the-year-spoofing-went-mainstream [https://perma.cc/SM3A-V8KY].
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432 and 575104 and ended in six-figure settlements.105 This development
can be attributed to various factors. First, to avoid liability risk, exchanges
may be taking the initiative by acting timely to nullify potential future
claims that they may face as alleged enablers of illegal conduct. Secondly,
such rapid advancement of spoofing enforcement on the exchange level
can also be explained by a greater consensus among market participants
against spoofing, and a demand by the market to improve fairness and
integrity in the markets in this regard. In this respect, greater enforcement
of the spoofing prohibition by exchanges can also act as a safeguard for
the industry to avoid negative reputational costs, which may result from
CFTC enforcement actions.
On the other hand, another important feature of the spoofing
prohibition is that the statute explicitly makes it available to private
market participants as a private cause of action.106 From a regulatory
efficiency perspective, this development is likely to have both positive
and negative effects.107 From an enforcement resources perspective, an
increase in the number of private lawsuits brought against conduct that
allegedly constitutes spoofing will lighten the CFTC’s burden in
enforcing the prohibition and encourage the agency to focus its
enforcement on the most important cases. This will also improve the
actual deterrent effect of the prohibition. On the other hand, private

104. E.g., HTG Capital Partners, LLC v. Doe(s), No. 15 C 02129, 2015 WL 5611333,
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2015) (“CME Group’s Market Regulation Advisory Notice also
clarifies that ‘Rule 575 prohibits the type of activity identified by the Commission as
“spoofing,” including submitting or canceling multiple bids or offers to create a
misleading appearance of market depth and submitting or cancelling bids or offers with
intent to create artificial price movements upwards or downwards.’”).
105. For a comprehensive list of the CME spoofing actions, see James A. Overdahl &
Kwon Y. Park, The Exercise of Anti-Spoofing Authority in U.S. Futures Markets: Policy
and Compliance Consequences, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., May 2016, at 1.
106. 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2012).
107. For a critique of judicially created private rights of action in areas entrusted to
agency enforcement, see Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and
Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1206-07 (1982) (“Judicial creation of private
rights of action raises greater difficulties when the legislature has entrusted enforcement
of a statutory scheme to a specialized administrative agency that is empowered to issue
rules or to adjudicate controversies under the statute. In this context, private rights of
action may usurp the agency’s responsibility for regulatory implementation, decrease
legislative control over the nature and amount of enforcement activity, and force courts
to determine in the first instance the meaning of a regulatory statute.”).
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litigation will impede the cohesive development of law in this area by
excluding the agency and its expertise, and potentially cause
interpretative differences between different circuits and the agency in
relation to the particulars of the spoofing prohibition.108 Furthermore,
because the private claimants will often be members of the particular
exchange in which the alleged spoofing activity took place, certain
restrictions that are frequently found in the exchange rules—such as
compulsory arbitration and data confidentiality—will likely undermine
the efficient enforcement of the spoofing prohibition through private
litigation.
As a relevant example, in 2015 a trader in the Chicago Board of
Trade filed a claim against anonymous defendants for conducting
spoofing.109 The plaintiff also issued a non-party subpoena to the CME
Group—which operates CBOT and CMEX exchanges—to identify the
anonymous counterparties and provide the relevant market data
pertaining to the suspicious activity.110 The defendants challenged this
subpoena on privacy grounds, and CME joined the motion.111
Subsequently, the anonymous defendants moved to compel arbitration
under CBOT rules, as required for the resolution of disputes arising
between CBOT members. The court ultimately granted the defendants’
motion to proceed anonymously and their motion to compel arbitration
after in-camera review of the relevant evidence documenting the
defendants’ membership in CBOT.112 The case demonstrates the
difficulties of bringing private actions for spoofing due to the
informational asymmetries in the market structure, as well as due to
potential forum shopping problems and other market asymmetries that
may result from the conflict among different enforcement rights of market
participants based on the particular market(s) of which they are members.
However, as demonstrated in cases like Oystacher where the agency
action substantially relied on data provided by other trading firms, the
jurisdictional and other problems the market participants may have in
bringing private actions are likely compensated by the CFTC’s newly
108. See generally Cass R. Sunstein et. al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54
STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1186 (2002).
109. HTG Capital Partners, 2015 WL 5611333, at *1.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. HTG Capital Partners, LLC v. Doe 1, No. 15 C 02129, 2016 WL 612861, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2016).
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established whistleblower program. The program provides monetary
incentives to industry insiders and other individuals in possession of
material information regarding potential spoofing activity who report
such information to the CFTC.113 In fact, market participants often
conduct in-depth studies regarding the markets—order books in
particular—as part of their day-to-day trading business with significant
analytical tools and analysts at their disposal. Under the CFTC’s
whistleblower program, such firms and individuals can be granted
significant monetary awards once the agency finds that they have reported
substantive and original information about the deployment of disruptive
trading strategies such as spoofing and thus have significantly assisted the
CFTC’s enforcement activities.114 As a result of the aforementioned limits
that market participants will have in pursuing private rights of action,
there is potential for an increase in the number of trading firms and
independent observers who will seek to monetize such material
information they may have generated in their internal market studies. In
this sense, the whistleblower program may reduce informational
asymmetries and improve enforcement efficiencies by placing the CFTC
in a more central position in monitoring wrongful conduct and evaluating
potential incidents of illegality based on the agency’s greater statutory
purpose and institutional power. On the other hand, the monopolization
of enforcement power at the hands of the regulators may predicate a
selective enforcement agenda, which may cause a sentiment of
indiscriminate and inconsistent enforcement of the rules within the
expanding jurisdiction of the agency.

113. 7 U.S.C. § 26 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 165 (2017) (providing the rules and
requirements of the whistleblower program).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 165.2 (2017). Subject to a decision by the agency’s staff and based
on the applicable rules, Dodd-Frank authorizes the agency to grant awards that are
between 10 and 30 percent of the monetary sanctions successfully imposed in the judicial
or administrative action resulting from the original information. Id. § 165.8.
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III. COMPARING CEA SPOOFING PROHIBITION WITH SECURITIES
LAWS
Generally, SEC actions for spoofing in trading have been primarily
brought under Section 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act (“Exchange
Act”).115 Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful to:
effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of transactions
in any security . . . creating actual or apparent active trading in such
security, or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.116

Although the language of the provision effectively brings spoofing under
its coverage, it more closely resembles the pre-Dodd-Frank commodities
price manipulation standard, and significantly differs from the simplistic
formulation adopted in the CEA (as amended by Dodd-Frank).117 Thus,
with the enactment of the standalone commodities spoofing cause of
action, a divergence seems to have formed between the price
manipulation prohibitions of the commodities and securities laws with
respect to the activities that fall under the definition of spoofing.118 More
specifically, the CEA’s spoofing prohibition requires a simple showing
that the defendant did not have a bona fide intent to enter into a transaction
when submitting an offer or a bid to the relevant market. On the other
hand, Section 9(a)(2) requires the showing of specific intent to manipulate
market prices,119 and a simple showing of spoofing activity may not be
sufficient in some cases to meet the more onerous pleading standard.

115. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2012); see Afshar, Securities Act Release No. 9983,
Exchange Act Release No. 76,546, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,926, 2015
WL 7770262 (Dec. 3, 2015); Briargate Trading, LLC, Securities Act Release No. 9959,
Exchange Act Release No. 76,104, 2015 WL 5868196 (Oct. 8, 2015); Visionary Trading
LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 71,871, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,007,
108 SEC Docket 2594 (Apr. 4, 2014); Hold Bros. On-Line Inv. Servs., LLC, Exchange
Act Release No. 67,924, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,213, 104 SEC Docket
2686 (Sept. 25, 2012).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2012).
117. John I. Sanders, Spoofing: A Proposal for Normalizing Divergent Securities and
Commodities Futures Regimes, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 517 (2016).
118. Id.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2012).
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Generally, markets for individual stocks, narrow-based index
contracts, and corresponding futures and option markets are regulated by
the SEC. However, the SEC shares regulatory authority with the CFTC in
relation to securities-based swaps, and the CFTC has greater regulatory
authority over broad-based index funds—such as S&P 500 index funds
and other equity-based passive index ETFs—that have recently seen
tremendous growth as convenient and diversified vehicles for investors to
channel their capital into equity markets. This interconnectivity between
commodities and securities markets was clearest during the flash crash,
in which spoofing-like activity in index markets was a likely factor in
causing massive market volatility. Thus, a concerted harmonization effort
by the SEC and the CFTC, as well as the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority and the National Futures Association is necessary to streamline
market monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and to remediate the
potential conflicts between the two legal domains.120 If left unaddressed,
the current situation may encourage regulatory forum shopping among
traders, who may channel their activities to less-regulated trading
regimes.121
CONCLUSION
The statutory enactment provides clarity to at least the fundamental
questions of whether spoofing is a disruptive practice, and whether it
negatively affects market integrity and markets’ pricing functions by
creating a statutory assumption in the positive.122 Although the spoofing
prohibition could previously be enforced under the general commodities
120. See Eric Hess, Spoofing Surveillance and Enforcement a Major Challenge for
Regulators, TABB F. (May 18, 2015), http://www.tabbforum.com/opinions/spoofing-sur
veillance-and-enforcement-a-major-challenge-for-regulators [https://perma.cc/B2P8-TH
5N].
121. Sanders, supra note 117, at 536.
122. See Craig Pirrong, I’m Not Spoofing You About Judicial Overkill, STREETWISE
PROFESSOR, (Nov. 4, 2015), http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=9678 [https://perma.cc/V
JF6-8HLH]. Professor Pirrong also argues that the impact of spoofing conduct will be
limited because the victims of spoofing are generally sophisticated traders who can
respond quickly to market conditions and take prompt action to protect themselves from
further damage. See id.; see also Jane Croft, Ex-SEC Economist to Testify on Flash Crash,
FIN. TIMES, (Oct. 22, 2015) https://www.ft.com/content/c6d56100-78c5-11e5-a95a-27d3
68e1ddf7 [https://perma.cc/4863-P6XJ] (“A former chief economist of the US Securities
and Exchange Commission is set to testify on behalf of a UK trader accused of playing a
role in the flash crash of 2010 while trading from his bedroom.”).
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anti-manipulation laws, defendants in these cases could assert a wide
range of defenses and even raise the issue of whether spoofing, from a
market theory perspective, can be a form of price manipulation. By
creating a stand-alone cause of action for spoofing, the prohibition can be
seen as an attempt to simplify the already complex inquiries that usually
arise in price manipulation claims (though it does not make them any
easier). These issues are often difficult for lay juries to properly digest,
since the defendants often rely on expert opinions who use advanced
market theory. Although the adoption of the stand-alone prohibition does
not solve the evidentiary difficulties in establishing the required mental
state (i.e., not having the intent to enter into transactions), it provides a
much-needed explicit normative basis on which regulators and market
operators can rely.
The enactment of the independent cause of action is also likely to lift
compliance standards. It will reduce the threshold for potential secondary
liability of market-makers, clearing brokers, and other intermediaries who
knowingly turn a blind eye to spoofing by their clients and customers—in
effect aiding and abetting conduct that is unlawful under the CEA. At least
in the Second Circuit’s jurisprudence, a strong showing of affirmative
assistance may not be necessary to meet 12(b)(6) pleading standards to
create secondary liability in similar cases.123 The risk for secondary
liability is particularly high for futures commission merchants124 who
transmit orders on behalf of their clients.125 In the context of wash sales,
the courts have considered the fact that wash sales were specifically
prohibited by the CEA and the relatively easier identification of wash sale
activity as factors that may potentially increase the liability risk of
123. See In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 183 (2d Cir.
2013) (“[A] complaint with weak allegations about a defendant’s affirmative assistance
may still state a claim for aiding and abetting if its allegations about the defendant’s
knowledge and intent are particularly strong, and vice versa.”).
124. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(28) (defining futures commission merchant); see also First Am.
Discount Corp. v. CFTC, 222 F.3d 1008, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“An FCM is the
commodity market’s equivalent of a securities brokerage house, soliciting and accepting
orders for futures contracts and accepting funds or extending credit in connection
therewith.”).
125. See In re LFG, L.L.C., CFTC No. 01–19, 2001 WL 940235, at *1 (Aug. 20,
2001); In re Piasio, CFTC No. 97–9, 2000 WL 1466069, at *3 (Sept. 29, 2000), aff’d sub
nom. Piasio v. CFTC, 54 Fed.Appx. 702 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Mitsubishi Corp., CFTC
No. 97–10, 1997 WL 345634, at *2–3 (June 24, 1997); In re Three Eight Corp., CFTC
No. 88–33, 1993 WL 212489, at *1 (June 16, 1993).
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derivatives brokers.126 For self-regulating entities and trading
infrastructure providers, the adoption of a prudent compliance strategy
can minimize future regulatory risks.
The spoofing prohibition may affect algorithmic traders significantly
by forcing traders to modify their existing trading algorithms. Different
from manual spoofing, when a trader employs algorithmic trading to
conduct spoofing, the algorithm’s code often provides direct evidence to
establish the necessary element of intent. It may, at first sight, seem
difficult to draw a bright line between lawful trading and spoofing activity
in the world of high frequency trading, as order cancellation is a natural
part of most legitimate trading strategies. However, spoofing can be
distinguished from other hyper-frequency strategies such as pinging and
front-running, as when properly deployed, the latter strategies involve
bona fide transactions entered into with an intent to detect market
appetite.127 Regardless of order size, market participants are advised to
review their algorithmic trading strategies, insofar as they involve
frequent and volatile position changes (flips) and high cancellation ratios
if they can be interpreted to demonstrate that the relevant order
cancellations have no legitimate purpose other than causing artificial
price movements. Under the statutory definition, a single event of order
cancellation is sufficient to establish the offense if the co-existing factors
provide sufficient circumstantial evidence that the trader, more likely than
not, never intended to enter into any transaction when submitting the bid
or the offer.
On the other hand, the rule’s effectiveness in providing fair and
meaningful deterrence from suspicious conduct will largely depend on the
developing case law, and clarity in the CFTC’s future regulatory guidance
and enforcement actions.128 Indeed, due to the prominence of hyperfrequency trading strategies in today’s markets, the CFTC is faced with a
difficult task in monitoring numerous markets within its jurisdiction and
identifying the instances of spoofing among millions of order
126. Amaranth, 730 F.3d at 187 (“Wash orders are explicitly banned by the CEA and,
because they involve simultaneous or shortly spaced transactions to buy and sell the same
quantity of a commodity or stock, they are much more recognizable to the broker
transmitting them.”).
127. See Gregory Scopino, The (Questionable) Legality of High-Speed ‘Pinging’ and
‘Front Running’ in the Futures Markets, 47 CONN. L. REV. 607 (2015).
128. However, the difficulties of factual determinations by juries in price
manipulation cases and the exchange’s reliance on mandatory arbitration will likely
inhibit the development of judicially created rules.
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cancellations. This practical difficulty may inevitably cause the agency to
pursue actions against the most visible high-volume traders in a
disproportionate manner, which may in turn undermine the promise of the
spoofing prohibition as a market rule that is enforced in a fair and equal
manner for all market participants. The potential risks posed by the
prospect of selective enforcement can be mitigated by greater cooperation
with market operators by prioritizing self-regulatory measures and other
structural safeguards that may be implemented within the daily trading
infrastructures.
From a compliance perspective, the rule poses a particular challenge
for market actors, as the scope of the prohibition and the evidentiary
difficulties that often arise in showing the necessary intent to commit
spoofing may undermine the market actors’ efforts to properly assess the
relevant regulatory risks and to devise proper implementation policies.129
The current state of the law, where a stand-alone spoofing prohibition
exists only as applicable to commodities markets, can also create
asymmetrical regulatory standards between commodities and securities
markets. This problem might be particularly acute and may cause legal
discrepancies in relation to financial assets that have the characteristics of
both a commodity and a securities instrument and that are subject to
regulation by both the SEC and CFTC.
As the relevant case law further develops and the CFTC fine-tunes
its interpretation of what can potentially constitute spoofing, participants
of the commodities markets are advised to pay close attention to these
developments and to revise their trading strategies, relevant policies and
procedures, and technical infrastructure to ensure compliance with the
new standards emerging in this field.

129. See Letter from R.T. Leuchtkafer to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC (Sept. 4, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-bats-2015-57/bats201557-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3
8R-N5UE] (“It’s also a mystery how a firm can post bona fide orders on eight exchanges
if it fully intends to cancel on seven of them when any one trades. That behavior sounds
as if it easily falls within the spoofing definitions quoted earlier . . . . At minimum, in this
example the business model seems to bake in an 87.5% intention of cancelling any given
order before it’s executed. At what point does ‘market making’ become spoofing in this
model? We can likely agree any firm posting an order it is 100% certain to cancel is over
the line. Now move that line to 99%. If I intend to cancel 99 times out of 100, is that a
bona fide order? How about a 9-in-10 intent to cancel? How about 7-in-8? And how does
anyone looking at an exchange’s quote tell the difference?”).

